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CRIMINAL LAW
THE COMPETENCE OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION TO PARTICIPATE
IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE*
RICHARD J. BONNIE**
I.

INTRODUCTION

On an initial view, the legal rules relating to the competence of
defendants with mental retardation to assist in their own defense'
seem both well-settled and well-suited to promote fairness in the
criminal process. As the Supreme Court noted in 1975, "it has long
been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he
lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial." ' 2 Whenever a
defense attorney has a good faith doubt regarding the competence
of his or her client, the attorney is obligated both to seek a clinical
evaluation of the issue and to bring his or her doubts to judicial
* Copyright 1990 by Richard J. Bonnie. All rights reserved.
John S. Battle Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, University of Virginia School of Law; LL.B. University of Virginia, 1969; B.A.
Johns Hopkins University, 1966. This article is based on a paper presented to a conference sponsored by The President's Committee on Mental Retardation in September,
1989, and will also appear as a chapter in a book published by the Committee. The
ideas developed in this article were initially formulated in a concept paper for the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Program of Research on Mental Health and
the Law. Research assistance by Mary Porto, University of Virginia School of Law Class
of 1991, and helpful suggestions by John Monahan and Ruth Luckasson are gratefully
acknowledged.
1 Although criminal defendants constitutionally are entitled to waive their right to
counsel and to represent themselves, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), this
issue is not of practical significance in cases involving defendants with mental
retardation.
2 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
**
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attention. 3 Further, whenever a bonafide doubt arises regarding the
defendant's competence, the trial judge is obligated to hold a hearing, whether or not the defense has requested one. 4 This obligation
arises at all stages of the proceedings.
A defendant found to be incompetent to stand trial may not be
convicted. 5 However, the defendant may be committed for the purpose of assessing the probability that competence can be affected in
the foreseeable future and for making efforts to do so. 6 Although
the long-term character of the disability precludes prosecution in
many cases, some competence-enhancing interventions may be
7
efficacious.
Notwithstanding the clarity of these broad legal principles, two
problems require attention. First, and most important, there is reason to doubt that, in practice, the interests of defendants with
mental retardation are adequately protected. I shall refer to this as
the problem of "under-identification." Second, latent ambiguity
concerning the concept of incompetence, and the values it is
designed to serve, has raised unresolved questions regarding the
legal significance of mental retardation in some cases. The problem
is most evident in the controversy regarding whether a defendant
who is competent to be tried may be found incompetent to plead
guilty. Each of these problems is addressed below.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF UNDER-IDENTIFICATION

According to most commentators, legally significant impair-

ments due to mental retardation are largely unrecognized by attorneys and courts.8 As Ellis and Luckasson have observed, "efforts
3 CRIMINALJUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-4.2(c) and accompanying commentary (1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
4 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
5 Pate, 383 U.S. at 378 (noting and apparently endorsing the government's stipulations "that the conviction of an accused person [who] is legally incompetent violates due
process .... "). Incompetence does not bar "innocent only" adjudications. Whether it
bars factual determinations that establish the necessary predicate for restrictive civil
commitment statutes is a controversial issue. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7-4.13 and accompanying commentary.
6 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
7 See generally I. Keilitz, Monahan, S.L. Keilitz & Dillon, Criminal Defendants with
Trial Disabilities: The Theory and Practice of Competency Assistance (Grant No.
G008535166) (Inst. on Mental Disability and the Law, Nat'l Center for State Courts,
Apr. 30, 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
8 See, e.g., Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 414 (1985) [hereinafter Ellis & Luckasson]; Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial
and the Mentally Retarded Defendant: The Needfor a Multi-DisciplinarySolution to a Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 365 (1981) [hereinafter Mickenberg]; Person, The Accused Retardate, 4 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 239 (1972).
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that many mentally retarded people typically expend in trying to
prevent any discovery of their handicap may render the existence or
the magnitude of their disability invisible to criminal justice system
personnel." 9 Impairments become visible enough to trigger evaluation, it is thought, mainly when the defendant is also mentally ill or
acts in a bizarre or disruptive fashion. 10
Although the "under-identification" hypothesis is widely accepted, empirical data on the issue are sparse. The hypothesis rests
on the following two suppositions: first, a substantial proportion of
defendants with mental retardation are not referred for psychological assessment; and second, this low rate of referral is attributable to
a general failure to recognize the "existence or magnitude" of the
disability."1 The main source of empirical support for the underreferral supposition is a 1966 case study of thirty-one prison inmates with mental retardation. The study found that pretrial psychological assessments had occurred in only three cases.12 Indirect
empirical support for the under-referral hypothesis can also be
found in studies of defendants who are referred for pretrial forensic
evaluation. These studies consistently show that diagnosed mental
retardation ranges between two percent and seven percent of the
pretrial referral population,' 3 as compared with about ten percent
4
of the correctional population.'
In the absence of any contradictory data, it seems reasonable to
assume that a substantial proportion (perhaps half) of defendants
with mental retardation are not referred for pretrial competence
evaluation. The key question is whether this pattern of under-refer9 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 8, at 458.
10 Id.
11 As noted infra note 13, forensic clinicians who are not trained to assess mental

retardation probably fail to recognize the magnitude of the disability even in cases referred for evaluation.
12 Brown & Courtless, The Mentally Retarded in Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions, 124
AM.J. PSYCH. 1164 (1968); Allen, The Retarded Offender: Unrecognized in Court and Untreated
in Prison, 32 FED. PROBATION 22 (1968).
13 In a database maintained by the University of Virginia Institute of Law, Psychiatry
and Public Policy, which encompasses a substantial proportion of forensic evaluations
conducted in Virginia fromJuly, 1985 throughJune, 1989, the proportion of defendants
diagnosed as retarded was 4.7%. R. Petrella, Offenders with Mental Retardation in the
Forensic Services System (1990) (unpublished manuscript available from the author)
[hereinafter R. Petrella]. See also Reich & Wells, Psychiatric Diagnosis and Competency to
Stand Trial, 26 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 421 (1985) (5.9%); J. Petrila, Selle, Rouse,
Evans & Moore, The PretrialExamination Process in Missouri: A Descriptive Study, 9 BULL. OF
THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 61 (1981) [hereinafterJ. Petrila] (7.3%o);
Heller, Traylor, Ehrich & Lester, Intelligence Psychosis and Competency to Stand Trial, 9 BULL.
OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 267 (1981) (2.5%).
14 Brown & Courtless, supra note 12.
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ral is normatively problematic. Even though many defendants with
mental retardation are not being brought to clinical (or judicial) attention, it is conceivable that defendants whose impairments are serious enough to amount to incompetence under the applicable legal
tests are being referred. It is therefore possible that the constitutional injunction against convicting incompetent defendants is not
being violated.
Whether legally significant disabilities are going unrecognized
by attorneys and judges has not been investigated empirically,1 5 and
no reliable inference, one way or the other, can be drawn from available data.' 6 In my opinion, however, the documented pattern of
under-referral is normatively problematic, even if all "incompetent"
defendants are being identified. This is because systematic underidentification of mental retardation tends to produce a pattern of
inadequate legal representation for clients who are functionally impaired, even though they are not so impaired as to fall below the
undemanding threshold of legal incompetence. The problem, in
short, is that current practice provides no margin of safety.
In cases involving mentally ill defendants, it is likely that forensic
and judicial practice errs in the direction of finding incompetence in
marginal cases, at least in the early phases of the pretrial process.
This is so for a variety of reasons, including the perceived need for
therapeutic restraint and the provisional nature of the finding of
"incompetence" in most cases. If a defendant with mental retardation
is found incompetent to proceed, however, "restoration" of competency is unlikely in most cases, and the pretrial finding of incompetence is therefore likely to be a definitive bar to adjudication. In
light of the dispositional consequences of a finding of incompetence, forensic and judicial practice probably tilt toward findings of
competence in marginal cases.
Another way of stating this point is that the threshold of competence for defendants with mental retardation is set relatively low in
15 This question can be answered empirically only by studying a representative sample of defendants with mental retardation who have not been referred for evaluation, and
comparing them, in terms of legally relevant incapacities, with defendants referred for
evaluation who are, and are not, found to be incompetent. This, of course, has not been
done.
16 It appears that about one-third of the defendants with mental retardation who are
referred for evaluation are found to be incompetent. See, e.g.,J. Petrila, supra note 13; R.
Petrella, supra note 13. If the referred defendants are those with the most severe impairments, then one might infer that few incompetent defendants are escaping detection.
However, if the referred defendants are representative of the entire population of defendants with retardation, one could infer that a significant proportion of the unreferred
defendants are significantly impaired.
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practice, and a substantial number of these defendants are, at best,
marginally competent. If this assertion is correct, the fairness of adjudication in most cases involving defendants with mental retardation depends largely on the ability and inclination of the attorney to
recognize and to compensate for the client's limitations. In this
sense, enhanced competence of attorneys is necessary to assure adequate representation of marginally competent clients with mental
retardation.
The pressures to cut corners in criminal defense, especially for
public defenders and court-appointed counsel working for set fees,
are well-known. Unfortunately, the risks of inadequate representation are magnified when the client has mental retardation, not only
because the client is in no position to monitor the attorney's performance even in a superficial way, but also because attorneys are
likely to spend less time interviewing clients with mental retardation
when more time is really needed.
If the attorney fails to employ discerning interviewing techniques to offset the well-documented tendency of persons with
mental retardation to conceal their disability, important facts are
likely to be masked or distorted. Clients with mental retardation
tend to act as though they understand their attorneys when they do
not, and to bias their responses in favor of what they believe their
attorneys want them to say or in the direction of concrete, though
inaccurate, responses. 17 Only attorneys who have had specialized
training or experience in representing clients with mental retardation are likely to be aware of these problems. For others, the risk of
unwittingly inadequate representation is a serious one.
When viewed from this perspective, the failure of the legal system to develop mechanisms for assisting lawyers who are representing marginally competent defendants-a problem that is much more
serious when the client has mental retardation than when the client
is mentally ill-is more significant, in practical effect, than the
under-identification of "legally incompetent" defendants.
Two corrective arrangements are available. The first arrangement is to assure that any defendant with recognizable deficiencies
in intellectual capacity is evaluated by forensic clinicians who have
specialized skills in dealing with persons with mental retardation.
The threshold for referral should be relatively low. These clinical
evaluations should be arranged, within the framework of the attorney-client relationship, for a dual purpose-to assess "legal incompetence" and to assure that the client is carefully and thoroughly
17 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 8, at 428-29.
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interviewed about the alleged offense by a properly trained person.
Implementing this proposal would require major changes in current
practice, not only because the evaluation-referral rate is currently so
low, but also because most forensic clinicians lack specialized understanding of mental retardation as well.
A second corrective arrangement would be to draw on specialized services for persons with mental retardation. In some cases,
interested family members or guardians now play an active role in
facilitating communication between defendants with mental retardation and their attorneys and in helping to make whatever decisions
the client is expected to make. However, most defendants with
mental retardation lack interested family representatives. In theory,
at least, it ought to be possible to provide adjunctive assistance in
these cases through judicially designated "representatives" or "consultants," not only to identify dispositional alternatives, but also to
facilitate informed representation by counsel.
In making these proposals, I have tried to direct attention to
issues of fairness in criminal adjudications involving persons with
mental retardation that are penumbral to the constitutional ban
against trying incompetent defendants. However, I also believe that
these observations cast some light on several controverted issues regarding the meaning and application of the constitutional norm.
The remainder of this paper will address these issues.
III.

THE MEANING OF INCOMPETENCE

In its most recent formulation of the test of "incompetence to
stand trial," the Supreme Court stated that the due process clause
bars trial of a person "whose mental condition is such that he lacks
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense." 1 8 It has often been observed that this "test" is open-textured and highly contextual in application. As noted in the commentary of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards ("ABA Standards"), "competence is functional in
nature, context-dependent and pragmatic in orientation." 1 9 Recognition of the functional dimension of the competence determination
has led forensic clinicians to develop checklists and protocols for
18 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Another, less comprehensive formulation appears in Dusky v. United States, 383 U.S. 375, 402 (1960):
[The] test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and ... a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
19 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7-4.1 commentary at 175.
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assessing various functions that a "competent" defendant is expected to perform. 20 Because increasing proportions of forensic
evaluations are being conducted by clinicians who have received
specialized training, it seems likely that this functional approach is
now more widely utilized in forensic practice than was the case ten
years ago. The ABA Standards themselves have contributed to improvements in forensic practice. Clinicians are now more likely to
recognize that the concept of incompetence is a legal concept, that a
defendant who has mental retardation (or is psychotic) is not necessarily incompetent for legal purposes, and that the relevant functional capacities relate to various forms of participation in the
criminal process, not to mental condition at the time of the offense
2
(i.e., to issues of "responsibility"). '
The increasing sophistication of forensic practice has helped to
expose a latent ambiguity in the construct of incompetence, one
which has particular bearing on the assessment of defendants with
mental retardation. In its most general formulation, the question is
whether competence to participate in one's own defense is a single,
open-textured construct, or a multiple construct. The most significant subsidiary question, which has befuddled courts and commentators, is whether competence to plead guilty is subsumed within a
broader construct of trial competence, or whether a defendant who
is competent to assist counsel (and proceed to trial) might not be
competent to plead guilty.
According to one view, a defendant is not competent to plead
guilty if he is not capable of understanding the alternatives and making a "reasoned choice" among them. 22 Under this view, a defendant with limited intelligence and conceptual ability may not be
competent to plead guilty even though he is competent to be tried.
Although this view has been endorsed by most commentators 23 and
20 See, e.g., Lipsett, Lelos & McGarry, Competency for Triak A Screening Instrument, 128

AM.J. PsYcH. 105 (1977); Robey, Criteriafor Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklistfor Psychiatrists, 122 AM.J. PSYCH. 616 (1965). See generally T. GRISSo, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES:
FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS (1986). Luckasson and Everington have de-

veloped a specialized instrument for defendants with mental retardation, the "Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation" ("CASTMR"). This instrument is available from the authors.
21 For earlier critical studies, see, e.g., Poythress & Stack, Competency to Stand Trial. A
HistoricalReview and Some New Data, 8J. PSYCH. & L. 131 (1980); Vann & Morganroth,
Psychiatristsand Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. DEr. L. REV. 75 (1964).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Sieling v.
Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
23 See, e.g., Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 693, 696-97 (S. Brakel,J. Parry & B.A. Weiner 3d ed. 1985); G. MELTONJ.
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by the ABA Standards, 24 it has been rejected by most courts. 2 5 The
prevailing judicial view appears to be that the "test" for competence
to plead guilty is the "same" as the test for competence to stand
trial.
I endorse the view that competence to participate in the criminal process is a multiple construct and that competence to plead
guilty (or to make other decisions) is conceptually (and clinically)
distinct from competence to assist counsel. In my opinion, however, the debate about whether the "test" for competence to plead
guilty is "higher" than the test for competence to stand trial has
largely obscured the underlying questions that are raised when defendants with limited intelligence plead guilty-questions concerning the nature and quality of the interaction between these
defendants and their attorneys.
A.

WHY INCOMPETENCE MATTERS

Although this is not the place for an elaborate analysis of the
competence construct, brief treatment of the subject is necessary to
establish a frame of reference and a conceptual vocabulary for the
following discussion. It is important initially to ask why a defendant's incompetence matters at all. A review of cases and commentary yields three conceptually independent rationales which, for
convenience of reference, might be labeled dignity, reliability, and
autonomy .26
First, a person who lacks a rudimentary understanding of the
nature and purpose of the proceedings against him is not a "fit"
subject for criminal prosecution and punishment. To proceed
against such a person offends the moral dignity of the process because it treats the defendant not as an accountable person, but
27
rather as an object of the state's effort to carry out its promises.
PETRILA, N. POYTHRESS & C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:
A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 97 (1987).
24 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7-5.1 and accompanying commentary

at 266 (Standard 7-5.1 "embodies the Association's judgment that a special norm ought
to govern plea proceedings").
25 See, e.g., Curry v. Estelle, 531 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1976); Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 F.2d
1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978).
26 There is surprisingly little theoretical discussion of the concept of incompetence in
the academic literature. Commentators tend either to rely on implicit rationales (as by
exploring "reasoning ability" without explaining why this might matter) or to refer explicitly to a variety of overlapping rationales. The reasons for the incompetence doctrine are most explicitly discussed in Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV.
454 (1967).
27 See H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 46-57 (1976). Whether or not one accepts the idea that wrongdoers have a right to be punished, or that punishment of
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The dignitarian rationale is implicated only in cases involving defendants who lack a meaningful moral understanding of wrongdoing and punishment. The procedural bar against prosecution in
such cases would seem to be uncontroversial.
Second, the main purpose of the incompetence construct is to
bar definitive adjudication in those cases, and under those circumstances, where the defendant is incapable of providing whatever
assistance is necessary to instill confidence in the reliability of the
outcome. To proceed against a defendant who lacks the capacity to
recall relevant information and to communicate this information to
his or her attorney would be unfair to the defendant, and would
undermine society's independent interest in the integrity of its criminal process. This is what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
stated that the bar against trying the incompetent defendant is "fundamental to an adversary system of justice." 28 When viewed from
the perspective of reliable adjudication, the concept of incompetence is instrumental in nature and is operationalized within the
context of the attorney-client relationship-a defendant is competent if he or she is able to communicate with counsel and to provide
whatever assistance counsel requires in order to explore and to
present an adequate defense on the defendant's behalf.
A third dimension of the competence construct, which is conceptually independent of the two dimensions already discussed, is
derived from legal rules which establish that certain decisions regarding the defense or disposition of the case must be made by (or
are within the prerogative of) the defendant himself or herself.
Some construct of "decisional competence" is an inherent, though
derivative, feature of any legal structure that prescribes a norm of
client autonomy. In theory at least, it is possible to imagine a system
of criminal adjudication that leaves no room for client self-determination-one which bars self-representation, which does not permit
guilty pleas, and in which all decisions regarding the conduct and
defense of the case (including those that waive constitutional protections) are made by counsel, not by the defendant. Under these
legal arrangements, a defendant's decisional competence would not
be relevant. But this is not our system. In our system, some deciwrongdoing is a categorical imperative, it is common ground that personhood is a moral
prerequisite to the imposition of punishment. As I have written elsewhere, no other
rationale satisfactorily explains our continued adherence to the traditional ban against
execution of presently incompetent prisoners. See Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the
Death Penalty: ConscientiousAbstention, ProfessionalEthics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14
LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 67, 86-88 (1990).
28 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).

428

RICHARDJ BONNIE

[Vol. 81

sions regarding the defense or disposition of the case are committed, by law, to the defendant and not to the attorney. According to
all authorities, these include decisions regarding the plea, and if the
case is to be tried, regarding whether it should be tried before a
jury, whether the defendant will be present, and whether the de29
fendant will testify.
B.

DECISIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTONOMY

Notwithstanding the fact that decisional competence rests on a
different conceptual foundation than other competencies required
of criminal defendants, it is often included as a component of a uni30
tary formula for what is usually called "competence to stand trial."
Forensic "checklists" used for competence-to-stand-trial assessments typically include items relating to capacity to "make decisions
after receiving advice," 3 ' "planning of legal strategy," 32 or "appreciating the consequences of various legal options."' 33 The commentary to the ABA Standards refers to "a capacity ...

to advise and

accept advice from counsel, to elect an appropriate plea and to approve the legal strategy of the trial." 34 According to one frequently
cited commentary, the constitutional standard requires "the capacity to make decisions during the course of the proceedings in re35
sponse to alternatives explained by the attorney."
Decisional competence is not properly understood as a component of a unitary competence standard. In the first place, recent
case law in a number of discrete contexts is incompatible with this
view. For example, courts have recognized that defendants who are
"competent to stand trial" may not be competent to make specific
29 See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (whether to plead guilty); Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (whether to testify); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver ofjury trial). See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note
3, Standard 4-5.2(a); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
30 Everyone agrees that "competency to stand trial" is a misnomer because 90% of
criminal cases are not actually tried. Golding and Roesch have suggested use of the
phrase "competency for adjudication." See Golding & Roesch, CompetencyforAdjudication:
An InternationalAnalysis, in 4 LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 73-

109 (D. Weisstub ed. 1988).
31 GROUP FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL

COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 896-97 (Vol. VIII, Rep. No. 89, Feb. 1974).

32 McGarry, Competency to Stand Trial andMental Illness (Proj. No. 7R01-MH- 18112-0 1)
(Harvard Medical School, Laboratory of Community Psychiatry 1974). A.L. McGarry
was the principal investigator for the project.
33 Golding, Roesch & Schreiber, Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to Stand
Trial: Preliminary Data on the InterdisciplinaryFitness Interview, 8 LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 321
(1984).
34 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7-4.1 commentary at 174.
35 Mickenberg, supra note 8, at 385.
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decisions, such as whether to raise an insanity defense 36 or whether
to decline to introduce mitigating evidence in capital cases. 3 7 As
noted earlier, courts are divided on whether the same should be said
of competence to plead guilty.
Second, it seems doubtful that trial courts would be inclined to
preclude adjudication altogether in cases involving defendants who
understand the charges and are able to assist counsel, but who are
not competent to make an "informed decision" about issues requiring more sophisticated understanding or complex risk-benefit judgments, such as whether to plead guilty or whether to waive a jury
trial. In practice, it seems likely that most courts avoid the consequences of a finding of "incompetence to stand trial" in such cases,
either by closing their eyes to the defendants' decisional incompetence or by splitting off the decisional competence issue and dealing
with it separately.
A 1984 Alaska case, McCarlo v. State,3 8 is illustrative. McCarlo
was charged with rape and attempted sexual assault. After being
found incompetent to stand trial due to mental retardation, he was
committed for six months during which the facility staff "worked
with [him] to improve his understanding of the judicial system and
the criminal proceedings he faced." 39 He was then found competent to stand trial. However, the trial court repeatedly refused to
accept McCarlo's proffered guilty pleas on the ground that he "did
not have sufficient understanding of the rights he would give up by
'40
pleading guilty."
At trial, McCarlo waived his right to a trial by jury. After a colloquy with him, the judge accepted the waiver, notwithstanding the
fact that "the dialogue ... indicated substantial confusion on McCarlo's part concerning the specific nature of the proceedings he
was involved in, as well as considerable uncertainty about the precise role of a jury." 4 1 Although the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, it obviously was a bit puzzled about
how to explain this result.
On the one hand, the court noted that McCarlo's "competence
to waive jury trial is implicit in the trial court's determination of his
36 See, e.g., Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054 (1988); Frendak v. United
States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
37 See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 739 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334, 340 n.1 (Pa. 1987).
38 677 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
39 Id. at 1270.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1273.
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competence to stand trial,"'4 2 an obviously fictional conclusion because McCarlo had been found competent to stand trial before this
issue arose, and the trial judge had obviously thought it required
separate attention. On the other hand, the appellate court also appeared to recognize that McCarlo's decisional competence required
an independent determination, and the court proceeded to set a relatively low standard. McCarlo's waiver was said to be valid, in effect,
simply because he had been able to express reasons for not wanting
a jury-he trusted the trial judge and a jury would make him nervous. 4 3 Regardless of the court's technical legal explanation for affirming the trial court's "finding" of decisional competence, it is
clear that the most salient factor in the court's decision was the attitude of McCarlo's attorney, who "acquiesced in the waiver of jury
trial and affirmatively indicated his belief that it was appropriate to
44
proceed with a non-jury trial."
As McCarlo demonstrates, questions about decisional competence, which implicate the principle of autonomy, must be exposed
for independent scrutiny if they are to be sensibly resolved. The
reasons (dignity and reliability) for barring adjudication when the
defendant is unable either to understand the nature and purpose of
the criminal process or to assist counsel do not apply when the defendant's deficits relate solely to the capacity to make sufficiently
"autonomous" decisions regarding the defense or disposition of the
case. Even though our system obligates attorneys to adhere to the
wishes of competent clients on certain issues, it does not follow that
adjudication should be barred if defendants are not competent to
make those decisions; other legal responses, such as allocating decisional responsibility to the attorney or directing the attorney to follow a "default" rule, are possible in such cases.
Further, there is no reason, in principle, why the definition or
"test" of decisional competence would necessarily be the same in
connection with all decisions. For example, a demanding test of
competence might be utilized if the defendant insists, over the attorney's advice, on pleading guilty to a capital offense, or refuses to
authorize the attorney to introduce mitigating evidence, 4 5 while a
less demanding standard might be appropriate if the defendant is
acceding to his or her attorney's recommendation that ajury trial be
Id. at 1272 n.3.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1273 n.l.
45 See generally Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L.
42

43
44

(1988).

REV.

1363, 1388-89

Cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 1985) (precluding a defendant from plead-

ing guilty to a capital offense without the consent of his or her lawyer).
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waived, as in McCarlo. In short, the criteria for decisional competence are likely to be highly contextual, depending on the value
placed on client autonomy and on the practical consequences of alternative approaches.
C.

A CONCEPTUAL VOCABULARY

In the remainder of this paper, I will employ a conceptual vocabulary that disaggregates the functionally distinct features of the
"open construct" typically called "competence to stand trial." I will
distinguish between a baseline concept of "competence to assist
counsel" (which reflects the dignity and reliability rationales of the
incompetence construct) and a highly contextualized concept of
"decisional competence" (which primarily reflects the autonomy rationale). By "competence to assist counsel," I mean to refer to the
46
minimum conditions for participating in one's own defense.
Although there is some room for debate about what the law "is" in
this context, courts and commentators generally refer to: (i) the capacity to understand the charges and the nature and purpose of the
adversary process; and (ii) the capacity to communicate rationally
47
with counsel about the facts of the case.
Because competence to assist counsel in the sense described
above is a baseline concept, a defendant who is not competent to
assist counsel will have no occasion to make decisions regarding defense or disposition of the case. 48 However, even a defendant who
46 Because of its "baseline" feature, "competence to assist counsel" might also be
characterized as "competence to proceed," a phrase that is occasionally used in lieu of
"competence to stand trial." However, "competence to assist counsel" has the advantage of conveying the functional content of the concept, which "competence to proceed" does not.
The phrase "competence to assist counsel" is admittedly underinclusive, in theory,
because it does not take explicit account of the possibility that a pro se defendant might
not be competent to proceed. However, even if the phrase is imperfect in this marginal
sense, it is still preferable to any of the apparent alternatives. Moreover, the capacities
required of defendants who seek to represent themselves should be encompassed by an
independent construct which includes not only the baseline capacities, but also the capacities required for self-representation and competent decision-making. Obviously a
defendant with retardation will not meet the criteria for self-representation and will not,
for this reason, be permitted to waive counsel.
47 This is, of course, a restatement of the "test" articulated in Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960). In addition, the concept probably encompasses a "motivational"
component pertaining to capacity to cooperate with one's attorney, thereby enabling the
attorney to perform his or her assigned role in the process. Cf. State v. Johnson, 133
Wis. 2d 212, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986). The puzzle in these cases is differentiating between "can't" and "won't," a problem not apt to arise in cases involving defendants with
mental retardation in the absence of a "dual diagnosis" of mental illness.
48 This construct also has a chronological dimension which helps to explain how it
ordinarily becomes operationalized: in many cases, questions about "competence to as-
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is (provisionally) competent to assist counsel may not be competent
to make specific decisions that are encountered as the process unfolds. As has been noted, the "relevant decisions" are those which
are committed, by law, to the competent defendant and not to the
lawyer-or, to state it the other way, those that counsel is not permitted to make on his or her own-whether they are made prior to
trial, at trial, or in lieu of trial. "Decisional competence" cannot be
addressed in the abstract or in the general sense described earlier; it
must be addressed in the context of the specific decision that is encountered as the process unfolds. Decisional competence requires a
contextualized inquiry.
Competence to assist counsel and decisional competence, as
defined above, seem to embrace the full meaning of the competence
construct, and I am presently inclined to regard "competence to
stand trial" as a redundant concept. 4 9 Thus, in the context of trial
proceedings, 50 the defendant must be competent to participate in
his or her own defense to the extent necessary to assure a fair trial.
This means the defendant must be "competent to assist counsel" in
the baseline sense described above-that is, he or she must be capable of understanding the proceedings and of engaging in rational
communication with counsel, as needed, during the proceedings. 5 1
A few discrete issues regarding "decisional competence" may arise
at the trial itself if they have not been anticipated, and resolved, during the course of pre-trial interactions with the attorney, 5 2 or, if the
defendant's decision must be verified on the record, as with a waiver
sist counsel" arise at the outset of the process-before significant interactions with
counsel have occurred and before strategic decisions regarding defense of the case have
been encountered or considered.
49 I have not yet come to rest on this question. It is possible that other mental capacities, not embraced by the constructs of competence to assist counsel and decisional
competence, are required for trial participation. However, my present view is that the
capacities required for trial participation are simply contextual applications of these two
concepts.
50 "Trial proceedings" are meant to include the sentencing phase of the trial in capital cases, and any other proceedings involving an evidentiary hearing.
51 A focus on the trial emphasizes the dynamic and sequential dimensions of competence assessment. A defendant who was regarded as sufficiently competent during earlier stages of the process (or whose competence was restored) may deteriorate under the
stresses of a trial.
52 Cases have arisen, for example, in which a defendant convicted of a capital crime
seeks to preclude his attorney from introducing mitigating evidence or arguing for leniency at the sentencing phase of the trial; in states where appellate courts have held that
the attorney is obligated to adhere to the defendant's wishes, they have also directed
trial judges to make contemporaneous assessments of the defendants' competency. I
have discussed this problem in Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REv. 1363
(1988).
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of jury trial. 53 One particularly intriguing issue concerns the competence of a defendant to waive his right to be present at trial, a
problem that usually arises in connection with disruptive conduct in
54
the courtroom.
The remainder of the paper applies these concepts to cases involving defendants with mental retardation. The next section
briefly illustrates the essential meaning of "competence to assist
counsel" in this context, and the final section addresses the problem
of decisional competence in relation to guilty pleas.
IV.

COMPETENCE TO ASSIST COUNSEL

As I noted earlier, judicial practice probably tilts against determinations of incompetence in cases involving defendants with
mental retardation in order to avoid the dispositional dilemmas
presented in such cases. It would be a mistake to assume, however,
that the construct of incompetence has no normative content. Empirical studies of forensic facilities consistently show that about ten
percent of the defendants found incompetent are mentally retarded, 55 and appellate courts reverse trial court findings of competence with sufficient frequency to demonstrate that the traditional
ban against adjudication has continuing normative force.
A review of appellate opinions on the subject 56 yields a relatively clear picture of the requirements for baseline competence to
57
assist counsel. Two recent cases are illustrative. In State v. Benton,
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the aggravated
rape and aggravated sexual battery convictions of a forty-three yearold man whose full-scale IQ (on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale-Revised) was forty-seven, and whose performance on the
various domains of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale was
58
roughly equivalent to that of an average five- or six-year-old child.
53 See, e.g., McCarlo v. State, 677 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
54 See, e.g., Sweezy v. Garrison, 554 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1982). Some decisions
may also be required as part of the sentencing process itself such as the exercise (or
waiver) of the right of allocution. See, e.g., Wotjowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786 (2d
Cir. 1977).
55 Data compiled by the University of Virginia Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public
Policy (July, 1985 - June, 1989) show that 8.2%o (38 out of 312) of defendants found
incompetent had diagnoses of mental retardation. See also, R. RoEscH & S. GOLDING,
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 149 (1980) (18 T);J. Petrila, supra note 13 (10%).
56 See generally Dove, Competency to Stand Trial of CriminalDefendant Diagnosedas 'Mentally
Retarded'- Modern Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4TH 493 (1983).
57 759 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1988).
58 According to the appellate court,

the record reveals that the defendant intellectualizes as a child five to seven years
old does. Efforts to educate him were abandoned after he attended his first (and
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Benton's incapacities clearly implicated the dignity rationale of the
incompetence doctrine-he was apparently unable to understand
the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings or the nature of
the charges against him. Accordingly to a widely shared judicial intuition, prosecution, conviction, and punishment in cases of this nature would demean the moral integrity of the criminal process.
In State v. Rogers, 59 a divided Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
a trial court finding of competence in a case which illustrates the
reliability rationale for the bar against adjudication. Rogers had
been charged with aggravated rape and had been evaluated by three
psychiatrists, who agreed that he was mentally retarded but disagreed about the severity of his disability. In finding Rogers to be
competent, the trial court relied primarily on the testimony of one
psychiatrist whose opinion, though equivocal, tilted in the direction
of competence. The court rejected the testimony of the other two
psychiatrists, who estimated Rogers' IQ to be about fifty and who
raised substantial doubts about his ability to assist his attorney. 60
The case came to the Louisiana Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal. Although nothing is said in the court's opinion about
the evidence introduced against Rogers at the preliminary hearing,
the impression clearly emerges that the court was worried about the
reliability of any conviction that might ensue. According to the preponderance of psychiatric opinion, Rogers had "extreme difficulty
in recalling events and circumstances" and "has periods of time up
to an hour and a half when he does not know what happened." 6 1 As
a result, he "would not be able to assist in his defense by recalling
his whereabouts, locating witnesses or testifying without confusion
or contradiction.- 62 Under these circumstances, the majority of the
court apparently concluded that the risk of an erroneous conviction
was unacceptably high.
Taken together, Benton and Rogers reveal the normative structure of the baseline concept of competence to assist counsel. The
ability to understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proonly) day of school. Consequently, he is unable to read or write and reached age
nine or ten before beginning to talk.... The defendant... has always lived at home
with his parents who treat him as a child. Almost everything he does requires adult
supervision.... He is never allowed to go anywhere alone because he passes out
almost every time he is in a crowd of people. He is unable to run a simple 'go get'
type of errand; that is, he 'doesn't understand what you tell him and forgets before
he gets to where he's going.'
759 S.W.2d at 430-31.
59 419 So.2d 840 (La. 1982).
60 Id. at 842-43.
61 Id. at 843.
62 Id. at 842.
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ceedings, and the essence of the charge of wrongdoing, is a relatively determinate precondition for competence to proceed. It does
not depend on the evidence against the defendant, but instead reflects a widely accepted moral intuition regarding the integrity of
the criminal process. The ability to recall and describe pertinent
events is a less determinate requirement and is, in practice, highly
contextual. What is required is a qualitative judgment in each case
regarding whether the defendant has sufficient ability to recall and
describe events (including mental "events") to enable the attorney
to explore and present an adequate defense. 6 3 What is sufficient, in
a given case, will depend on the evidence against the defendant and
on the plausible lines of defense.
V.

DECISIONAL COMPETENCE AND THE GuiLTY PLEA PROBLEM

As noted above, decisional competence is conceptually and
clinically distinct from competence to understand the criminal process and communicate with counsel. Although the relevant psychological capacities may overlap, decision-making about defense
strategy obviously encompasses conceptual abilities, cognitive skills,
and capacities for rational manipulation of information that are not
required for assisting counsel. The key question is how demanding
the test for decisional competence should be.
Although forensic experts have not yet conceptualized the
clinical content of alternative tests of decisional competence in the
context of criminal defense, the formulations developed by Appelbaum and Grisso in their continuing research on decisional competence for medical treatment can be used as a starting point. 64 The
ability to understand relevant information about a particular decision is
the criterion most often utilized in many decisional contexts. This
"test" involves the basic idea that clients who cannot understand the
relevant considerations after they have been conveyed, or who cannot understand their own prerogatives as a "decision-maker," are
not competent to decide whether to accept or reject the attorney's
advice. This test, which is purely cognitive, can be varied in its stringency according to which considerations are regarded as relevant,
and therefore must be understood by the defendant. This point is
63 Cf. Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1973) ("The defendant must have

some minimum ability to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to
his defense.... But this does not mean that a defendant must possess any high degree
of legal sophistication or intellectual prowess. In determining competency, the standard
ofjudgment must be a relative one ... ").
64 See generally Appelbaum & Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment,
319 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1635 (1988).
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especially pertinent in cases involving defendants with mental retardation, who may have the capacity to understand some considerations (e.g., the nature of the alternative courses of action-plea or
trial, jury trial or bench trial), but may not be able to understand
others (e.g., the risks or consequences of choosing one course or the
other).
A defendant who is able to comprehend relevant information
may be unable to appreciatethe significanceof that information in his or her
own case. Problems in appreciating the situation and its consequences may arise due to limitations in cognitive capacity, to disturbances of thought, or to affective disorders. In the context of
defendants with mental retardation, a deficit of appreciation may
arise from an inability to translate the information (about the consequences of a particular course of action) to his or her own situation.
Finally, a defendant who is able to understand information relevant to a decision and is able to appreciate the "meaning" of the
decision in his or her situation, may nonetheless lack the capacity to
use logical processes to compare the benefits and risks of the decisional options. Again, assuming the person is able to understand
relevant information, the inability to engage in rational manipulation of
information (or to engage in a rational decisional process) may be
relevant in cases involving defendants with all forms of mental
disability.
As this summary of alternative clinical formulations demonstrates, the legal "test" for decisional competence can be made
more or less demanding. Moreover, it is clear that the choice of a
"test" must turn on a theory of autonomy in the context of the attorney-client relationship, and on the consequences of a determination of incompetence. Although comprehensive discussion of these
issues would far exceed the ambition of this paper, I will offer an
exploratory analysis of the problem in the context of the controversy about the "test" for competence to plead guilty.
When analyzed within this conceptual framework, guilty pleas
by defendants with mental retardation implicate two different concerns that must be isolated for separate consideration. First, the admissions embedded in a guilty plea may not be reliable. To the
extent that reliability is the underlying concern, a finding that the
defendant is competent to make the necessary admissions is a necessary condition for a fair adjudication if the adjudication is to be accomplished by a guilty plea. Second, even if the reliability of the
defendant's admissions are not in doubt, the defendant may be regarded as "incompetent" to plead guilty (and waive his or her constitutional rights) because he or she lacks the capacity to render a
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sufficiently "autonomous" decision. Because decisional competence in this sense is not a necessary condition for a fair adjudication, the "test" for competence to plead guilty, when viewed from
this perspective, depends entirely on the theory of autonomy that is,
or should be, reflected in the law.
A.

RELIABILITY

Substantial reliability concerns are raised whenever a defendant
with mental retardation pleads guilty. All of the concerns about reliability of confessions described by Ellis 6 5 are even more pronounced when inculpatory admissions are embedded in a plea of
guilty. Limited conceptual skills, biased responding, and submissiveness to authority may mask significant doubts about criminal liability, especially in relation to culpability elements. The risk of
unreliable pleas is further magnified by structural arrangements in
criminal justice administration that encourage negotiated pleas.
Public defenders or appointed lawyers often spend little time probing the more subtle aspects of criminal liability that may be most
pertinent in the defense of persons with mental retardation.
This problem is nicely illustrated by Gaddy v. Linahan.6 6 Gaddy
and his uncle were charged with murder and burglary in a case involving the stabbing of the victim in his home. They were apprehended two days after the offense following a high-speed
automobile chase. Shortly after the indictment, Gaddy's uncle pled
guilty to both charges. About a month later, Gaddy, a thirty yearold man who could not read or write, pled guilty to "malice murder" pursuant to a plea agreement under which the prosecution
agreed not to seek the death penalty and to dismiss the burglary
67
indictment.
After noting, for the record, Gaddy's "limited education and his
inability to read," the trial court asked the prosecutor to read the
indictment, and then asked Gaddy whether he had talked to his attorney about the charge, whether he understood it, whether he understood that he was waiving various rights by pleading guilty,
whether he had made up his own mind to do so, and other aspects
of the standard plea colloquy. Gaddy simply answered "yes, sir" to
virtually all of these questions. 68 The trial court then accepted the
plea and sentenced Gaddy to a life term. Proceedings were subse65 Ellis, Confessions By Defendants With Mental Retardation (1990) (unpublished

manuscript available from the author).
66 780 F.2d 935 (1 1th Cir. 1986).

67 Id. at 938.
68 Id. at 938-40.
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quently initiated in state court to set aside the plea on a variety of
grounds, including the allegation that Gaddy did not understand the
elements of the offense of "malice murder." After these efforts
were unavailing, habeas proceedings were filed in federal court. 69
Based on the description of the evidence in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, it seems likely that this is what happened: Gaddy's
attorney met with him briefly a couple of times. Although Gaddy
said that he was "innocent" because his uncle had stabbed the victim, the attorney quickly reached the conclusion that Gaddy was
criminally liable as an accomplice to felony murder because he had
been present during the alleged burglary and killing. There is no
indication, however, that the attorney interviewed Gaddy carefully
about Gaddy's awareness of, or degree of participation in, his uncle's conduct, or that the attorney ever tried to explain to him the
"elements" of complicity or felony-murder on which the plea of
guilt was predicated. The record reveals that none of this occurred
during the plea colloquy either.
In the absence of a more complete understanding of the charge,
Gaddy's plea was hardly "an intelligent admission of guilt," and
might well have been an unreliable one. (Gaddy probably understood that he was pleading guilty to the offense of "murder," which
he understood in a lay sense, but he did so because his lawyer led
him to believe that he could be sentenced to death if he didn't plead
guilty.) As the Eleventh Circuit said:
The transcripts of the plea hearing and the state habeas hearing fail to
indicate whether the petitioner had any understanding of the elements
of malice murder, whether the facts of his case fit those elements, or
whether the state had proof sufficient to obtain a conviction at trial.
Neither petitioner nor his attorney represented at either hearing that
they had discussed details of the crime. The record does reveal that
defense counsel believed that petitioner's conduct fulfilled the elements of the crime of malice murder. But counsel never said that he
had explained his conclusion to petitioner. All we learn from counsel's testimony is that he and the petitioner talked with each other
about the constitutional rights petitioner would be waiving by pleading guilty and that petitioner would not have the benefit of the prosecutor's recommendation of a sentence of life imprisonment if
petitioner opted for a trial.
The only evidence the State can rely on to establish the fact that
petitioner knew and understood the elements of malice murder is the
one-sentence indictment that prosecutor read to petitioner during the
plea hearing. The terms "murder" and "malice aforethought," as they
appear in the indictment, are not readily understandable by a layman,
particularly one of minimal intelligence. They are complex legal
69

Id. at 940-41.
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terms, the discussion of which consumes pages of Georgia case law.
Considering the petitioner's lack of intelligence, his expressed confusion, the complexity of the case, and the extraordinary consequences
of pleading guilty to malice murder, a more thorough explanation of
the nature of the crime
and its elements was required to satisfy the
70
tenets of due process.
In cases involving defendants with normal intelligence, attorneys are likely to elicit relevant information regarding the offense,
and are likely to explain the elements of legal guilt to the defendant.
As a result, guilty pleas are more likely to represent reliable admissions of guilt. However, in cases involving defendants with subnormal intelligence, special precautions are required to offset the many
factors which propel the system toward efficient outcomes rather
than reliable ones. 7 1 Gaddy may have had the capacity to understand the offense and to make an intelligent admission of guilt, but
his interactions with his attorney and the court were insufficient to
assure that he in fact did.
Insofar as reliability is the underlying concern, the capacities
required for competent guilty pleas are substantially congruent with
those required for competence to assist counsel. The defendant
must have a sufficient understanding of the charges, in lay terms,
and a sufficient understanding of what happened at the time of the
offense, to "understand and agree that he performed some acts and
that those acts are unlawful." ' 72 Whether the acts admitted by the
defendant provide a sufficient foundation for the plea is a legal
judgment which must be made initially by the attorney and then by
the court. In this respect, the "test" for competence to plead guilty
is not "higher" than the test for competence to assist counsel; however, this formulation of the issue misses the key point-the fact that
the defendant has been "found" to be competent to assist counsel
(or to "stand trial," in the usual phrase) does not establish the reliability of the admissions that may subsequently be embedded in a
guilty plea. This matter requires careful attention by counsel and
independent scrutiny by the court at the time of the plea. The
"'competence" of the defendant with mental retardation to plead
70
71

Id. at 945-46.

1 am putting to one side the concern with undermining the finality of adjudications
based on guilty pleas that has led the Supreme Court to state that it "may be appropriate
to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit."
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436 (1983) (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426
U.S. 637, 647 (1983)). For present purposes, the important point is that attorneys often
fail to provide sufficient explanations in cases involving defendants with limited intelligence, as the Supreme Court itself noted in Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647.
72 Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1978).
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guilty must be given heightened consideration, not because the
"test" is higher but because careful scrutiny is necessary to assure
that the defendant's admissions, when taken together with other evidence, provide a reliable foundation for the plea.
B.

AUTONOMY

The complexion of the "competence-to-plead-guilty" issue
changes considerably when it is viewed in terms of autonomy. Consider the facts of Allard v. Helgemoe.7 3 Allard was charged with burglary. He apparently admitted that he had broken into the building
where the crime occurred and had taken property there.7 4 He apparently understood that these acts were wrong. It appears, however, that, according to his imperfect recollection of the relevant
facts, he may not have had a conscious purpose to steal when he
entered the building, and may have "succumbed to the temptation"
to steal after he was already there. This fact is legally significant
because he would not be guilty of the offense of burglary if he
lacked the "intent to steal" at the time he broke into the building.
Allard's attorney had done what Gaddy's attorney failed to do.
He had carefully interviewed his client and reached a judgment that
Allard was guilty of breaking and entering and theft, but that his
liability for the more serious burglary offense was at least open to
doubt. Notwithstanding this doubt, he concluded that Allard would
probably be convicted of burglary if he went to trial and recom75
mended a guilty plea in anticipation of a more lenient sentence.
Allard's attorney tried to explain all this to him. However, due
to his limited intelligence, Allard apparently was unable to understand the relevant legal distinction. 76 The judge's colloquy at the
time the plea was made and accepted did not expose the problem.
In a subsequent challenge to the validity of the guilty plea, Allard's
new attorneys argued that he had not been competent to decide to
plead guilty because he lacked the capacity to make a "reasoned
choice" among the alternative courses of action. The central con73 Id. at 1.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2.

76 The district court's finding on this issue was as follows:
The petitioner may have understood the intent requirement of burglary at some
time for a brief period, but he did not carry that understanding with him to his plea
hearing, nor was he ever able to thoroughly comprehend the importance of the
element of the crime....

It is unlikely that he will ever be able to comprehend the

element of intent required, and the other elements of burglary as they distinguish it
from the crime of breaking and entering, and retain that comprehension for any
length of time.
Id. at 2 n.l.
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tention was that "an understanding of the elements of the offense
with which one is charged is essential in practical terms to make any
77
kind of informed evaluation of the probability of success at trial."
Resolution of the issue posed in Allard's case requires a theory
of autonomy. Allard knew and understood that the decision to
plead guilty or go to trial was his to make, that he could get a more
severe sentence if he went to trial, and that his attorney had recommended a guilty plea. Allard, however, was not able to make his
"own" evaluation of the alternatives. At best, he was able to decide
to follow his attorney's advice. Is this enough? If not, it would seem
likely that many defendants with mental retardation are not compe78
tent to plead guilty.
An analogous problem arises in treatment decision-making. In
this context, legal rules requiring informed consent have been
designed to create conditions conducive to autonomous patient decision-making, even though most patients choose to defer in practice to their physicians' recommendations. If a patient is not able to
understand a salient aspect of the disease or the possible effect of a
proposed treatment, it might be said that the patient is not "competent" to give informed consent. Although physicians often rely on
incompetent "assents" under these circumstances, avenues of surrogate decision-making typically are available.
How should the problem of "incompetent assents" be handled
in the context of attorney-client decision-making in criminal defense? There are three possibilities. One is to adopt legal rules that
reflect a "softer" or "weaker" theory of autonomy than that which
was implicit in the argument advanced by Allard's habeas attorneys.
It can be explicitly recognized, for example, that a "reasoned
choice" by the client is an idealized norm, not a legal predicate for a
valid decision (here, a valid guilty plea). Although the lawyer is expected to make a "reasoned choice" among alternatives, based on
his or her specialized knowledge, and the client is entitled to exercise
an independent prerogative, client deference to the attorney's judgment is the expected norm. Under this view, the law would require
only that the client know and understand that the decision is his or
hers to make, and that the lawyer make an effort to inform the client
Id. at 5.
For an example of a case in which the defendant was found competent to stand
trial (for rape) but not competent to plead guilty because "he did not have a sufficient
understanding of the rights he would give up by entering a guilty plea," see McCarlo v.
State, 677 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). McCarlo demonstrates that the gap
between competence to assist counsel and decisional competence (to plead guilty) can
arise even in jurisdictions that have rejected the Sieling "reasoned choice" formula. Id. at
1272 n.2.
77
78
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of the relevant considerations. However, since a reasoned choice
among alternatives is not the legally prescribed norm for client decision-making, an inability to do so does not constitute decisional incompetence. This was the position taken by the First Circuit in
Allard:
We must accept the obvious fact that different defendants will have
different abilities (as will their counsel) in making all legal decisions,
including the decision whether or not to plead guilty as opposed to
going to trial. Most will have no choice but to rely heavily on the advice of their counsel
in evaluating all the factors affecting their chances
79
of success at trial.
A second possibility is to adopt a more demanding theory of
autonomy, one which envisions a more active client role in decisionmaking. Under this view, which has been endorsed by many commentators and a minority of courts, a guilty plea is not valid if the
defendant lacks the capacity to make a "reasoned choice." As I have
suggested, this position implicitly rests on a set of expectations regarding client autonomy in the attorney-client relationship that is
somewhat heroic when compared with actual practice. In addition,
however, this approach, under which "incompetent assents" to negotiated guilty pleas would be invalid, is subject to a significant
practical objection because it bars only one of the decisional options. The other option, going to trial, remains legally availableassuming, of course, that the defendant is able to understand the
proceedings and assist counsel in that context. As a result, those
defendants who are competent to be tried, but who are (unrestorably) incompetent to plead guilty, are denied the possible advantages of plea bargaining.8 0
The analogy to medical treatment suggests a third possible solution to the problem-namely, reliance on surrogate decision-making. The idea of using a surrogate decision-maker for "decisionally
incompetent" criminal defendants may appear far-fetched at first
glance. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Delverde,8 1 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts emphatically rejected the defense attorney's
effort to utilize a surrogate decision-maker to enter a guilty plea on
behalf of a defendant with mental retardation. It is important to
recognize, however, that Delverde was also incompetent to stand
trial, and that any conviction in the case, by plea or otherwise, would
79 Allard, 572 F.2d at 6.
80 Although it has been suggested that defendants found incompetent to plead
should be able to "enforce" any plea agreement previously arranged, or should be entitled to whatever sentencing leniency would otherwise have been accorded, see Ellis &
Luckasson, supra note 8, at 464-65, these solutions are not feasible.
81 398 Mass. 288, 496 N.E.2d 1357 (1985).
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have violated the constitutional prohibition against convicting defendants who lack "baseline" competence to assist in their own defense. 2 In contrast, when the standard for decisional competence is
elevated in a specific context, and a defendant is sufficiently competent to be tried, some form of surrogate decision-making might be a
plausible response to a difficult problem. In other words, if neither
the dignity nor the reliability of the criminal process is implicated,
and the only basis for decisional incompetence is an inability to
make sufficiently "autonomous" decisions, surrogate decision-making would not contradict the principles of fairness embodied in the
due process clause. Nor is surrogate decision-making altogether
unprecedented in the criminal process. An increasing number of
courts have held that a mentally ill defendant who is "competent to
stand trial" may not be competent to decide whether or not to invoke the insanity defense.8 3 These cases can sensibly be understood
as permitting the attorney (or the judge) to serve as surrogate deci84
sion-maker.
Reliance on surrogate decision-making to "solve" problems of
decisional incompetence might be regarded as problematic when
the defendant is refusing to do what the attorney believes to be in
his or her best interests. When the "surrogate" overrides the defendant's objections in such a case-which is equivalent to the imposition of medical treatment over a patient's incompetent refusalthe subject's known preferences are ignored on the basis of the controversial assertion that they are not entitled to respect. However,
in cases involving incompetent "assents," surrogate decision-making provides a costless solution to the problem of decisional incompetence. Surrogate decision-making provides a device for
vindicating the best interests of the subject when he or she may not
be able to do so, and it also provides a mechanism for monitoring
the judgment of attorneys, a task that "normal," self-interested clients are expected to perform for themselves.
As these observations imply, the real issue in cases involving
82 The opinion does not elaborate on Delverde's capacities, so it is not possible to
ascertain the respects in which he was incompetent.
83 See, e.g., Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054 (1988); Frendak v. United
States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
84 A "pure" version of surrogate decision-making would involve appointment of a
"guardian" to make the decision on the defendant's behalf. This solution is preferable
to allowing the judge or the defendant's attorney to make the decision. A law-trained
guardian would be preferable to the judge because the surrogate should stand in the
defendant's shoes (whether the perspective is substituted judgment or "best interests"),
something the judge is in no position to do. A law-trained guardian would also be preferable to the defense attorney because he or she could "check" the attorney's reasoning
in a way that a "competent" defendant might be expected to do.
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marginal decisional competence is not autonomy but quality assurance. In cases involving defendants with mental retardation who are
otherwise competent to assist counsel, some form of contemporaneous monitoring would be desirable to assure that the attorneys'
judgments are in their clients' best interests. At the present time,
neither the court nor any formal surrogate decision-maker is serving
this function. As was suggested earlier, however, designated "representatives" (such as family members or advocacy services) might
usefully be utilized in this context. They could serve in a formal
surrogate role if the "test" for decisional competence is a demanding one, such as "capacity for reasoned choice," or in an adjunctive
role if the "test" for competence is less demanding.
C.

SUMMARY

Capacity for "reasoned choice" is too demanding a test for decisional competence. It reflects a conception of autonomy that is at
odds with a realistic understanding of the attorney-client relationship in criminal defense. A less demanding test of "understanding,"
similar to the one formulated in Allard, is sufficient. However, this is
not to say that the test for competence to plead guilty is the "same"
as the test for competence to assist counsel (or to stand trial) or that
a finding of competence to assist obviates the need for assessing
competence to plead guilty, as many courts seem to have assumed.
The competence of a defendant with mental retardation to
plead guilty requires careful assessment in order to assure both that
the admissions embedded in the plea are reliable and that the defendant understands the nature and consequences of the plea. Routine attorney-client interactions and routine plea colloquies will not
do the job.
At a minimum, when a plea is proffered by a defendant with
mental retardation, the judge must assure that an adequate clinical
evaluation has been conducted, and must affirmatively seek to satisfy himself or herself concerning the factual basis for the plea and
the defendant's understanding of its consequences. In addition, adjunctive involvement by family members or advocacy services can
ameliorate the difficulties in communication between attorney and
client, and if plea decisions are to be made, they can provide an
independent assessment of the attorney's recommendation. 8 5 If the
85 This same analysis is applicable to all other contexts in which decisions regarding

the defense of the case are allocated, by law, to the defendant rather than the attorney.
As a practical matter, most decisions (other than those regarding the plea) concern issues that arise at trial, such as whether to be tried by ajury and whether or not to testify.
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standard for decisional competence to plead guilty is not set too
high, these persons would not be needed to serve as formal surrogate decision-makers. However, by serving these facilitative and
monitoring functions, this adjunctive participation would provide
the margin of safety that is currently lacking in cases involving mentally disabled defendants.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has focused on one central theme-the critical normative issue raised by current practice in cases involving defendants
with mental retardation is whether these defendants are receiving
adequate legal representation. As a practical matter, the procedures
for assessing and judging the competence of defendants with mental
retardation must be designed and administered to enhance the competence of counsel.
The low rate of referral for pretrial forensic evaluation raises
the possibility that some defendants with mental retardation who
"should" be found incompetent are now being convicted. The
more significant problem, however, is that lawyers are probably providing inadequate representation to the much larger number of
marginally competent defendants whose disabilities can be counteracted by skillful interviewing and counseling. This problem can be
ameliorated by providing thorough forensic assessment and consultative assistance, by appropriately trained clinicians, in any case
involving a defendant with significantly subaverage intellectual abilities, and by drawing on the services of trained representatives for
the persons with mental retardation.
When viewed from this perspective, the controversy regarding
the correct "test" for competence to plead guilty comes into clearer
focus. To the extent that guilty pleas by defendants with mental
retardation raise concerns about the reliability of the admissions
embedded in the pleas, these concerns can be ameliorated by assuring that counsel is able to make an informed judgment about the
reliability of the defendant's acknowledgments of guilt and by assuring that courts carefully scrutinize the factual foundation for these
pleas. Judicial sparring over the correct "test" for competence to
plead guilty tends to obscure the real problem.
Guilty pleas by defendants with mental retardation (or other
decisions regarding the defense or disposition of the case) are also
problematic due to doubts about the defendants' capacity for "autonomous" decision-making. Put simply, the issue is how the law
should deal with decision-making by marginally competent defend-
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ants who assent to the advice of their attorneys even though they are
not able to understand all of the relevant considerations. Resolution of this issue depends on what steps are thought to be necessary
to assure that decisions being made are in the defendants' best interests. A "default" rule against guilty pleas (or against waiver of
other constitutional rights) would often not be in these defendants'
best interests; this is why a demanding standard of decisional competence is undesirable, at least in the absence of a procedure for
surrogate decision-making. However, uncritical acceptance of simple "assent" in these circumstances is also undesirable in light of the
significant danger of ill-considered legal advice. Some form of adjunctive participation by designated representatives for defendants
with mental retardation, together with careful judicial monitoring of
these decisions, would provide necessary incentives for improved
legal representation.

